Thursday, March 18, 2010

Impounding Vehicles and Section 1983

Two cases -- one a 9th Circuit case (jurisdiction - Arizona) -- and the other a 7th Circuit case / district court case (jurisdiction - Illinois) are representative of the movement of the federal courts to deter impoundment of vehicles for relatively minor traffic offenses based upon 4th Amendment violations.

Both cases begin with terrible facts which tick off the courts (and juries).

About 5 years ago there was a case, Miranda v Cornelius, where the 9th Circuit held that, basically, it's unconstitutional to tow somebody's car for "fun" even when technically there might be an ordinance supporting - or even demanding - the impoundment.

That is, the 9th Circuit held that just because the driver does not happen to have a license, police cannot tow the car when it is safely parked on the owners' driveway.

No officer in this country could have created worse facts than in Miranda to start this snowball sliding down the slippery slope of disaster for officers all over the country.

So here goes. An officer sees a car being driven very slowly and uncertainly in a residential area. The officer, believing that the driver was impaired, decided to stop the car.

After the officer turned on his lights, the driver pulled onto a driveway.

The officer soon learned that the driver was an old lady, Mrs Miranda, being taught by her husband to drive. The husband, who was a passenger, was licensed, had a registration and was insured.

The officer "threw the book" at both Mirandas -- giving them both tickets -- and having the car towed under an ordinance authorized by statute that permitted the tow if the driver was unlicensed.

The 9th Circuit ruled the seizure of the vehicle to be unconstitutional because it did not "fit" the community caretaking doctrine (or any other exception to the warrant requirement).

I need to make a couple of important comments here --

1. The federal courts don't give a (pardon my french) _ _ _ _ about statute or an ordinance that runs contrary to a constitutional principle. The general rule here is that officers can (almost) never use an ordinance or state statute to defend against a Section 1983 action.

2. The 9th Circuit can be a bit wacky - but it is very influential as it is the jurisdictional / power center for the entire west coast (including AZ, e.g.). When another federal court in the country (like the 7th Circuit in Illinois) runs into a legal issue, they will often have to resort to the cae law of the 9th Circuit as the 9th Circuit will have often already decided the issue as that court decides many more legal questions than any other jurisdiction because of its size.

So that brings me to a recent ILLINOIS case, Harrington v Harvey, where the Federal District Court relied on Miranda to decide a similar issue.

Here are the facts of that case - Harrington's son, Jeffrey, was driving the parents' car and was stopped for speeding.

Because Jeffrey did not have a valid license -- as he had failed to renew it -- the officer decided to issue two tickets, and tow the car, based on a local ordinance.

During the stop, Jeffrey's parents showed up and begged the officer to turn the car over to them. The officer responded that he couldn't do that.

Mrs. Harrington sued the officer under Section 1983.

The District Court ruled that the plaintiff must be awarded damages and reasonable attorneys fees. One of the cases relied upon in the decision was the Miranda case, above.

The problem is that the court doesn't really explain any in detail justification for impoundment during a traffic stop except community caretaking.

These are very dangerous precedents for all communities in Illinois and Arizona.

I have warned officers in my seminars for the past 10 years -- be very careful about impounding vehicles if the vehicle is lawfully parked and / or there is a licensed, sober person there to whom the offender wishes to give the keys.

Some officers will be caught between an ordinance that REQUIRES towing and the Constitution, which forbids it -- which are you going to obey???

Best -

DA

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Saturday, March 6, 2010

What courts do officers have to pay attention to??

A really good officer / friend of mine once told me that officers are never told about jurisdiction within the court system -- and so, never know what cases govern their conduct.

Officers send me cases from Connecticut, etc. all the time, asking me about the law. I tell them to be careful about following case law from other "jurisdictions."

So here is the short - long answer.

The most important cases, most of the time, are the USSC opinions as those cases create the rules you have to follow.

The Illinois (Arizona) Supreme Court and Illinois (Arizona) Court of Appeals cases are the stories / facts of cases where the state courts explain how the facts of the case in front of them / at bar fit the rules of the US Supreme Court.

Some times the USSC has not yet created a rule for a particular circumstance -- in such cases the Illinois Supreme Court creates the rule -- a good example would be whether you can enter a home to arrest for misdemeanors -- and if so, when.?? Over and over the Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois Court of Appeals have had to create the rules related to these types of problems (e.g. the rule related to entering noisy and / or underaged drinking parties!!!)

The trial court generally does not have the power to create rules per se that are different from the higher courts, but they do have discretion as to whom to believe. Most of the time a trial court can suppress evidence and not worry about getting reversed by just saying they believe one side or the other based on the credibility of the witnesses. But if there is a case on point, the trial court must follow the case -- as on legal issues, the courts of appeals control.

Cases generally do not get appealed from the state courts to the federal courts of appeals -- they go directly from the Illinois (Arizona) Supreme Court to the USSC.

The federal court system has the federal district court as the trial court, then the federal court of appeals and then the USSC at the top of the pyramid.

The main way officers are impacted by the federal system is if you / officers are sued under Section 1983. This is the federal statute that was enacted to permit law suits to be brought by citizens if officers / state officials violate constitutional rights of citizens.

The main cases here are USSC cases that (again) set the rules related to Section 1983 -- and the 7th (9th) Circuit Court of Appeals -- where there is an ever increasing number of cases that explain when officers can / cannot be successfully sued.

I should mention that when a court of jurisdiction is reviewing a case of "first impression" (the court has never seen the facts before -- or the law is not immediately apparent) -- the court may "borrow" from other jurisdictions that have reasoned through the problem out before. Because the 9th Circuit is much bigger than any other jurisdiction, it decides many many more cases than any other jurisdiction -- therefore the 7th Circuit some times borrows ideas from that -- and other -- circuits.

Some times the federal district courts in Illinois (Arizona) are important, but most of those important cases eventually get appealed to the 7th (9th) Circuit Court of Appeals for (sort of) final resolution. Very very rarely does the USSC take a Section 1983 action.

Clear as mud? If you have questions about this e-mail me.

Best -

DA

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Saturday, February 27, 2010

Seminar(s) -- Spring

I have a seminar I'd like you all to consider signing up for --
It's NEMRT sponsored.
It's a three-day search and seizure -- for supervisors --
But I would like officers to attend if you can.
It's at the Winnetka Police Department, April 7-9.

All of the following seminars are in MTU 3 area and are NEMRT sponsored.
YOu can find them by googling NEMRT -- or just logging onto NEMRT.com
Check out the Legal Section.

Crystal Lake -- March 30 - April 1 (S and S)
'
Winnetka -- April 7 - 9 (S and S)

Burbank -- April 14 - (Interrogations -- the law of taking statements)

So Barrington -- April 16 (Civil Liability)

Algonquin -- April 21 - 23 (S and S)

LaGrange Park -- May 5-7 (S and S)

Buffalo Grove -- May 12 (Recent Case Law)

Bolingbrook -- May 26-28 (S and S)

Best -

DA

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Sunday, February 21, 2010

Seeking consent after a traffic stop

The United States Supreme Court ruled relatively recently that normally the only important "scope" issue during a traffic stop is time. Officers can ask just about any question of anyone in the car, can ask for consent and can call out a dog -- as long as they do everything within the same time it takes for a traffic stop.

So the next question is -- how long is a traffic stop?

Recently a court held that 14 minutes was too long a time during a traffic stop to call a dog out. The dog hit on the car 14 minutes after the stop and the evidence was suppressed. People v Baldwin

In another case an Illnois court ruled that 18 minutes was not too long to issue two tickets.

There is another way to get around Baldwin.

The Illinois Supreme Court case of People v Cosby stands for the proposition that once an officer returns a driver's paperwork and license, the stop / seizure is over. Therefore, if a driver will remain after that, there is no real time limit as there is no seizure. so then an officer can ask for consent to search -- or bring a dog out.

Best -

DA

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Reasonable Suspicion -- Illinois is one of the toughest states in the country

If you aren't sure you have reasonable suspicion to stop someone, you should simply engage the suspect in a tier 1 contact if the suspect is on foot, or get a legitimate traffic stop if the suspect is in a vehicle.

Pedestrian Suspects
An officer drove into an apartment parking lot at 3:30 am. The lot was a high crime area where there had been numerous car burglaries. Kipler came out from behind a dumster and walked across the parking lot. The officer stopped him.

The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that the facts did not constitute reasonable suspicion. Therefore the stop was unconstitutional.

Suspects in Vehicles
An officer sees a guy, Cordero, parked in a parking lot where all the stores are closed. His car is apparently the only car in the lot. As the officer drives up to the Cordero the guy drives off. The officers stops Cordero and determines that he is drunk.

The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that the facts did not constitute reasonable suspicion. There fore the stop is unconstitutional.

Think about what I am stating -- Illinois is about the toughest state in the country on reasonable suspicion. If you aren't sure if you have it, try to do a contact if the suspect is on foot and or get a traffic violation if the suspect is in a car.

Best -

DA

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The Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of GANT

In a recent case the Illinois Supreme Court put its Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval on the dictum in GANT.

In that case People v Bridgewater, 918 NE2d 553 (2009), an officer stops the car Bridgewater is driving and subsequently arrested for obstructing. Bridgewater is handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the police vehicle.

Officers then search Bridgewater's car and discover a gun.

The court in ruling that the gun was not admissible, stated,

"Following Gant, a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest is authorized only when:
(1) the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the vehicles's passenger compartment at the time of the search;
or
(2) officers reasonably believe evidence relevant to the crime of the arrest may be found in the vehicle."

Best -

DA

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Reasonable belief the arrestee is in the house

Illinois is extremely liberal / easy in it's rules on entering premises to execute a warrant when you do not see the arrestee inside.

In Stibal, the officers testified that they thought Stibal had only one vehicle, and that vehicle was parked in the driveway.

The court ruled that that information was sufficient to enter with an arrest warrant.

(Stibal actually had just taken off on his motorcycle.)

Best -

DA

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Tier 1 -- You can't give orders

The courts in Illinois are beginning to reach a consensus that officers cannot give orders in Tier 1 -- consensual encounters, contacts.



In People v Tate, a man, Tate, drove onto to a driveway where officers were executing a search warrant. The officers demanded to see the Tate's hands. When he wouldn't show his hands, the officers pulled him out of the car.



The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that the order basically created a detention. Since there was no reasonable suspicion, the detention was ruled unconstitutional.



Note Here -- There was no reason to believe the suspect in the home was selling drugs. Therefore there was no reason to believe that Tate was there to buy drugs.



In a more recent case an officer approaching a suspect in relatively high crime area ordered the suspect, Jackson, to take his hands out of his pockets four times. Jackson finally did take his hands out and a gun fell out on the ground.



The Illinois Court of Appeals in this case ruled that the orders / commands turned a contact into a detention. Since there was no reasonable suspicion the evidence was suppressed.



In order to keep a Tier 1 contact situation, thry to request -- rather than order. And try to only have one other officer -- not two.



Obviously, the most important fact is that you must go home at night -- just realize that the court is looking for the fact that you make a contact consentual. If you can't just remember that the evidence seized will probably be suppressed.



Best -



DA

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Parolee Searches and Seizures

The big case at the United States Supreme Court level is Samson v California, 547 US 843. In that case, an officer stopped a parolee walking down the street without reasonable suspicion. The officer then searched the parolee and discovered meth in a cigarette package.

The United States Supreme Court ruled that the search was constitutional and the evidence admissible because:
-- parolees have an extremely low expectation of privacy – not much higher than if they were (still) in prison.
-- the conditions for parole, which the parolee signs, states that parolees must consent to searches.

The big case in Illinois is People v Wilson, 885 NE2d 1033. In this case Wilson signed an “agreement” as a condition of his parole that stated in part, “you shall consent to a search of your person property or residence under your control.” Wilson was required to sign this order before parole could be granted.

An anonymous caller stated that Wilson had narcotics and guns at his apartment. Wilson’s parole officer and police entered the residence where Wilson was living. Officers immediately handcuffed Wilson and then searched his bedroom, finding drugs.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to search Wilson home as he had waived his rights, and he had such a low expectation of privacy.

My opinion:

1. The parolee who is a pedestrian
Officers may normally stop a parolee in the street and search him without reasonable suspicion.

2. The parolee who is in his home
No one knows yet if officers may enter a parolee’s home without reasonable suspicion – or whether a parole officer must initiate the search.

3. The parolee in a car
Normally, I would say that if an officer can stop a parolee in on a sidewalk with reasonable reasonable suspicion, he can also stop him in a car -- as there is no real difference constitutionally. But in this instance, I just don’t know. We’ll have to wait for a ruling in Illinois.

Probably most important is that officers read the parole agreements themselves. These conditions for parole are usually boilerplate and impose relatively the same conditions on all parolees.

Best –

DA

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Monday, September 28, 2009

Consent searches of suspects

Q: I am a patrol officer and attended your search and seizure class a while back. I was wondering if you could shed some light on consensual searches. Specifically, how far can you go searching a person if they verbally and in writing consent to a search of their person, especially if they are a suspect? Pat down only? Same as custodial search? Remove outer garments?

A: Good question. the USSC in the DRAYTON case ruled that you can do the search of a person during a tier 1, consensual encounter. You can ask him to remove the outer gaments during a consenual encounter -- you cannot tell him to.

Illinois has ruled in People v Holliday that you cannot search the crotch area during a consent search as that exceeds the scope of a consent search of a person.

(A crotch search does not exceed the scope of a lawful TERRY search.)

Other than that, a consent is usually wider in scope than a TERRY search as you can actually go INTO the pockets to do your search.

If you have reasonable suspicion against the suspect, you can probably order him to remove a jacket -- but I would ask, if I were you. Why do you need for him to remove his jacket?

Best -

DA

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What is the level of suspicion necessary to enter with an arrest warrant

Q: Hi, hope all is well. Could you please provide an opinion on arrest warrants, at your convenience. Specifically, the burden of the officers reasonable belief that the suspect is at the house at the time the officers enter. We have an arrest warrant, and common sense and the totality of the circumstances states he is there; He receives public aid, has no job, his wife/kid live there, his car is parked out in front. We think this is enough to enter and execute the arrest warrant. I guess my question is, do we have to see him, or is it enough to factor in time of day (he would be sleeping, no job, car is there, etc;) to assume he is present. I know reasonable suspicion is a higher burden than we think it is.

A: PAYTON created the rule here -- and I think the USSC in PAYTON said "reasonable grounds" -- or some test that was equally unfathomable. The Illinois courts have been extremely lenient when applying the rule laid down in PAYTON. Many courts have required probable cause to believe the arrestee is home. I would suggest that Illinois requires something slightly less -- maybe even reasonable suspicion. Who knows.

The only case I could find in Illinois where the court ruled the officers did not have the requisite suspicion was one where the officers entered the arrestee's home knowing he was at work.

I would say generally that if the arrestee lives there and his car is there, he is in there. Whether that is PC or RS, I don't know.

Best -

DA

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Friday, August 14, 2009

Forced Entry of Premises With an Arrest Warrant

Q - If you have a valid arrest warrant for a subject, and you know he is inside his own residence (or his parents), does it make any difference if the warrant is a felony or misdemeanor as far as forcing entry to the residence to make the arrest? Also, is there specific case law regarding forcing entry into the residence to make the arrest with a valid arrest warrant?

A - Yes, there specific case law regarding your question, and the answer is generally no, the courts officially due not usually distinguish between a felony and misdemeanor warrant (see People v Sain in my book). But a lot of prosecutors -- and judges -- do not like forcing entry based on misdemeanor warrants.

I suspect that this question arose from a very controversial case that has more facts. I have been told about some of those facts.

Officers go to the suspect's home to arrest him on a misdemeanor warrant. He is not there but at his parent's home. so the officers go there. They knock on the door, and the suspect comes to the door. The officers tell the suspect that he is under arrest. The suspect will not come out. So the police enter and arrest him.

Now is where the trouble starts. Apparently, the officers want to get the arrestee's shoes for him. The parents tell the officers to get out of their home. The officers get into an argument that turns into a fight with the parents (both some where between 60-90 years old I think?).

The parents are arrested. The prosecutor refuses to prosecute -- drops the case.

So the parents sue under Section 1983 for a civil rights violation -- presumably no search warrant to enter their home and excessive force.

The problem for the police here, IMO, is that in order to enter a third-party's home to arrest a suspect, they must have a search warrant. Otherwise, the police are violating the third party's rights -- not the arrestee's rights.

So, in the final analysis, will the officers lose? -- Probably.

I sincerely believe that had the officers secured the arrestee and wisked him away without roaming through the parent's home to get the arrestee's shoes, everything would have ended ok here.

So -- officers should be careful in situations such as these.

Obviously, if the arrestee lives in more than one home, officers may enter any of his homes forcibly with an arrest warrant if they have probable cause to believe the arrestee is in a particular home.

BTW - If anyone knows any more about the facts, etc in this case, I would be more than happy to be educated.

Best -

DA

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Fall Seminars -- Illinois

These are the classes offered by NEMRT (MTU 3) that you might be interested in. You can check the NEMRT catalogue or go on line (NEMRT.com) for more info

August 24 -- Traffic Stops (S and S) -- Crystal Lake

August 25-28 -- S and S for Sgts -- Gurnee

August 31 -- Traffic Stops (S and S) -- Downers Grove

September 1-3 -- S and S for Offs -- Batavia

September 8-10 -- S and S for Drug Offs -- Tinley Park

September 14 -- Traffic Stops (S and S) -- Westchester

September 15-17 -- S and S for Offs -- LaGrange

September 22 -- Statements Law -- Norridge

September 24 -- Civil Liability -- Winnetka

September 29 - October 1 -- S and S for Sgts -- Channahon

October 5-7 -- S and S for Drug Offs -- Lake Zurich

October 26-28 -- S and S for Offs -- Niles

October 30 -- Recent Cases -- St. Charles

Hope to see you at one of these!

Best -

DA

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Blogs, E-Mails, USSC Term, Misc

I know that I have trouble getting to my blogs. Again, I apologize. But I will try at least to spend a day or two every month trying to catch up.

I welcome your e-mails at my e-mail address -- DAA2000@aol.com. I get 5-10 e-mails a day.

I try my best to get back to you as soon as possible. But some times I frankly don't know the answer, so I can't respond until I find time to do some research.

So for some of you that have e-mailed me, and haven't heard back, please e-mail me again.

If you want to know more about the Illinois or Arizona books, please e-mail me.

The United States Supreme Court is more or less at recess from August until October, so I have tried to capture all of the important cases of the term before completing those books -- for the last time.

Best -

DA

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Friday, June 19, 2009

GANT - An article for Illinois Attorneys

Is Gant the biggest (criminal procedure) case since Miranda?

Who knows?

Miranda is arguably the biggest 5th Amendment case of all time.

Will Gant be the biggest 4th Amendment case?

For 28 years, police officers all over the United States had a “free” search of the passenger compartment of vehicles after they had arrested an occupant out of a vehicle.[1] No more.

First, what do we mean by “free?”

All legal “rules” must be tied to a rationale – a reasoning. We all learned that in law school. Some how the search incident to arrest rule became unanchored from its rationale, i.e. the search incident to arrest doctrine as applied to vehicles had, over the last 28-year period, lost its “reason” for existence.

Originally, the rationale for the search incident exception to the warrant requirement was to protect officers from an arrestee’s lunging to access a weapon or destroy evidence.

In order to understand the importance of this issue (and the Gant decision), attorneys (and officers) must understand the following “trilogy” of United States Supreme Court cases, which culminates in Gant.

Chimel v California (1969)
The holding in the landmark case of Chimel v California[2] was basically that, after the lawful arrest of Chimel, officers could not search other rooms in the house because Chimel could not access them.

In Chimel, officers arrested the suspect and then discovered valuable evidence related to the crime in another room. The Supreme Court said that the search incident doctrine required that the search be limited to areas where Chimel could access a weapon or destroy evidence, areas within Chimel’s immediate control at the time of the arrest.

New York v Belton (1981)
Twelve years later the United States Supreme Court tackled a search incident to arrest case involving a vehicle. This occurred in New York v Belton.[3] In Belton, an officer lawfully arrested four occupants of a vehicle, one of whom was Belton, and placed them at the four exterior corners of the vehicle. The officer did not handcuff the arrestees. The officer found Belton’s jacket in the back seat, unzipped a pocket and found drugs. . The Court decided to create the “bright-line” rule in this situation that officers could always search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, and closed containers therein, incident to the valid custodial arrest of an occupant of the vehicle.

Most state courts, including Illinois, interpreted this to mean that officers could search the passenger compartment whether the arrestee was handcuffed or not. Illinois courts went even a step further ruling that locked containers in the passenger compartment could be searched incident to a valid custodial arrest. In People v Tripp,[4] for example, the Illinois court of Appeals, District 1 held that officers could search a locked foot locker in the passenger compartment, explaining as follows:

“Even though the defendant may no longer have access to the vehicle and may be restrained in custody, the police are still free to search the vehicle. Bailey, 159 Ill.2d at 506, 203 Ill.Dec. 459, 639 N.E.2d 1278. Further, it has been held that locked glove compartments are subject to search as containers within the vehicle. See United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257 (7th Cir.1995).
In the present case, defendant was arrested after he failed to produce his driver's license and insurance and the police subsequently discovered a handgun beside the front passenger seat. At this point, defendant was under arrest for a weapons charge as well as a traffic violation. The officers were free to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle ( Bailey, 159 Ill.2d at 506, 203 Ill.Dec. 459, 639 N.E.2d 1278), including any containers found within the passenger compartment, such as locked glove compartments ( Woody, 55 F.3d at 1270), or a coat pocket that was zippered closed ( Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860). Based upon Belton and Bailey, we therefore find that the search of the locked footlocker, found within the passenger compartment of *954 defendant's vehicle, was properly searched incident to his lawful arrest.”

But the United States Supreme Court had never decided the specific issue of whether passenger compartments or closed containers could be searched incident to a valid custodial arrest after the arrestee had been handcuffed – at least until Gant.

Arizona v Gant (2009)
In Gant, officers arrested Gant as he got out of his vehicle based on an arrest warrant for a suspended license. The officers then handcuffed Gant and searched the passenger compartment of his car, finding a weapon and drugs.

Both the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court determined that Belton could not be construed to extend the search incident doctrine to situations where the arrestee had been handcuffed.[5]

The United States Supreme Court in Gant held that a car may not be searched incident to arrest after the arrestee has been handcuffed and placed in the patrol vehicle because at that point there is little chance that the arrestee can get to a weapon or evidence.

Other Vehicle Search Theories That Remain Viable
Although the search incident to arrest doctrine has been altered probably forever, the other long-standing theories for searching a vehicle remain the same. They are:
probable cause (the automobile exception);[6]
probable cause (warrant);[7]
consent;[8]
Terry doctrine;[9]
emergency / exigency doctrines;[10]
inventory;[11] and
miscellaneous doctrines / theories.[12]

Issues Raised by Gant But Not Resolved
The Supreme Court resolved an important issue in Gant but raised some others. A couple of those issues will be important to Arizona attorneys and will inevitably have to be resolved by Arizona courts:

1. Will officers be permitted to search for evidence related to the arrest?
The majority stated, in dictum, that although officers cannot automatically conduct a search incident to arrest after the arrestee has been handcuffed, officers may search for evidence related to the arrest. This may be referred to as the “Scalia doctrine” as it was he who proposed this approach to the search incident doctrine in a case several years ago.[13] An example would be that, if an occupant of a vehicle is arrested on an arrest warrant for drugs, the officers may search the vehicle for drugs.
It will undoubtedly be the burden of the officer to explain how the evidence searched for in the vehicle is related to the arrest.[14]

Furthermore, the “scope” of the search, under the Scalia doctrine, might well now extend to the trunk. Under the Belton doctrine, officers could not search the trunk – only the passenger compartment. But there is no reason why the Scalia doctrine should be so limited.[15]

2. Will the Gant doctrine be extended to premises and other areas?
Defense counsel will want to expand the Gant doctrine to situations not involving vehicles. In all likelihood, Arizona courts will rule that, once an officer handcuffs an arrestee in his / her home, officers will not be permitted to search pursuant to the search incident to arrest doctrine, except possibly under the Scalia doctrine (looking for evidence related to the arrest as discussed above).

3. Will officers be able to search if there are uncuffed occupants?
Most attorneys have long forgotten that Miranda was a 5-4 decision. So was Gant. (Most attorneys have already forgotten that too.)

So what did the dissenters say? Alito, writing the dissenting opinion, mentioned something in the last footnote that might prove salient:

“I do not understand the Court's decision to reach the following situations. First, it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but not all of the occupants of a vehicle. The Court's decision in this case does not address the question whether in such a situation a search of the passenger compartment may be justified on the ground that the occupants who are not arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence. Second, there may be situations in which an arresting officer has cause to fear that persons who were not passengers in the car might attempt to retrieve a weapon or evidence from the car while the officer is still on the scene. The decision in this case, as I understand it, does not address that situation either.”

Conclusion
So is Gant the most important criminal procedure case since Miranda?

A strong argument could be made that, as it relates to law enforcement, it might well be. Only time will tell.

There is only one thing that is certain about Gant -- and that is the holding. Around the country, the vast majority of courts had interpreted Belton to mean that officers could always search passenger compartments incident to arrest, even after the arrestee had been handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the patrol car. Those states will be required to revise their case law to comply with Gant.[16]

Will officers now leave arrestees un-cuffed while they search vehicles in order to comply with Gant and Belton? Probably. Will officers be injured – or even die – in the process?

Well, at least the courts (and officers) know now the search incident to arrest rule is anchored to a rationale, at least for the time being….



[1] In many states. officers were permitted to search even locked containers in the passenger compartment under this theory. See, e.g., People v Dieppa, 830 NE2d 870 (Il. App. 2005), where the court held that, although the arrestee was handcuffed and secured in the patrol car, officers could search a locked glove box in the arrestee’s vehicle.
[2] 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
[3] 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
[4] 306 Ill. App.3d 941, 715 N.E.2d 689 (1999)
[5] 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640 (2007)
[6] See e.g. Chambers v Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)
[7] See e.g. Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
[8] See e.g. Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
[9]See e.g. Michigan v Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
[10] The exigency / emergency doctrine has more or less been supplanted by the automobile exception. See Texas v White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975)
[11] See e.g. Florida v Wells, 495 U.U. 1 (1990)
[12] These searches are very limited in number. See e.g. New York v Class, 465 U.S. 106 where the Court held that warrantless VIN searches were justified during traffic stops.
[13] Thornton v United States, 541 U.S 615, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (2004)
[14] After the Chimel decision forty years ago, no one, except Scalia, to the knowledge of the authors, has proposed that evidence of a crime could be subject of a search without probable cause (or in the case of a weapon, reasonable suspicion). So this will be a new doctrine that Arizona courts will have to wrestle with to work out the contours. Stevens, in his majority opinion, described the level of proof as “might” be and “likelihood” that crime-related evidence would be there. Arizona v Gant, 129 S.Ct. at ___. Although this issue is somewhat beyond the scope of this brief article, it is a question which probably will arise early in the case law. Possibly the courts should choose “reasonable suspicion” as the standard of proof even though that standard has already been rejected by the Supreme Court as a “legal thicket” in Arizona v Hicks, 480 U.S. 385 (1978). Determining the parameters of this doctrine might be somewhat like punching the proverbial tar baby, so for purposes of this article, suffice it to say this will, in all “likelihood,” be an issue.
[15] Again, if the rationale for the Scalia doctrine is that there might be evidence related to arrest in the vehicle, why should the scope be limited to passenger compartment? In Belton, the United States Supreme court stated that the trunk was off-limits during a search incident to arrest as there was almost no possibility that the officer could access the trunk.
[16] That includes Illinois which had numerous cases expanding the Belton doctrine to include searches of the passenger compartment and even locked containers after the arrestee had been handcuffed.

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Saturday, April 11, 2009

Giving Orders During A Consenual Encounter

A Tier 1 encounter is one where the citizen is free to leave at any time. A Tier 2 encounter is one where the suspect is detained (like a TERRY or a traffic stop). And a Tier 3 encounter is one where the suspect is restrained in a significant way (like handcuffing).

Normally, during a Tier 1 -- or consensual -- encounter an officer may not order, or tell, the suspect / citizen to do anything.

Apparently in Illinois an officer cannot even order a suspect to show his hands during a consensual encounter. People v Jackson (March 30, 2009).

In Jackson, an officer was patrolling his "beat" and saw Jackson walking up and down the block for 40 minutes, looking into store windows and "checking out people."

The officer approached Jackson because of Jackson's suspicious behavior and because of the "numerous robberies in the area in the past."

Below is the officer's testimony about his encounter with Jackson:

"Q. As you approached the defendant on foot, did you tell the defendant to do anything?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What did you tell the defendant to do?

A. I told him to remove his hands from his pockets.

Q. Why did you tell the defendant to do that?

A. For my safety.

Q. How many times did you tell him the defendant to remove his hands from his jacket pocket.

A. At least three to four times."

When Jackson took his hands out of pockets a gun fell out onto the ground -- and Jackson ran. Jackson was subsequently apprehended and made a motion to suppress the gun.

The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that under the MENDENHALL case, the fourth factor was dispositive -- "compliance with the officer's request was compelled. When the defendant complied, a seizure took place. There was no legal basis for it" as the officer could not testify that Jackson was doing anything more than window shopping and did not match the description of any robber.

The court stated that "after the third or fourth command by the officer a 'reasonable man would have believed that he was not free to leave.'"

Therefore the gun was suppressed.

I think that officers should contact their FOP lawyer to write an amicus / friend of the court brief to the Illinois Supreme Court on this case --

1. Officers should always be permitted to see a suspect's hands during a consensual encounter.

2. This decision creates a dangerous dilemma for officers dealing with dangerous suspects during consensual encounters. If you cannot see a suspect's hands, you can die.

3. There was a strong dissent that said that since Jackson never really complied with the officer's orders (in that he ran away), he was never seized.

Best -

DA

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Monday, April 6, 2009

People v Vasquez - Terry Stop of Driver, Consent

Vaquez is an interesting case.

A motel clerk gets paid by HIDTA officers for tips.

The clerk calls HIDTA because a guest, Vasquez, paid cash, was staying for one night, and was from Texas. The clerk's suspicions were also aroused because Vasquez paced the lobby, walked outside, looked around as if looking for someone, looked into his own vehicle and came back into the lobby. He did this several times. Finally Vasquez asked for a pay phone even though he had a cell phone.

The clerk made a copy of Vasquez' license and gave it to officers.

Officers ran the license and determined that Vasquez had two arrests for narcotics.

Vasquez went to an auto store and bought a wrench. Then he went to a garage and drove in. The garage door then closed.

When Vasquez drove away, the officers stopped him on a TERRY stop.

The officers then obtained a consent to search in writing.

The officers saw bolts loose around the bumper and other indications of tampering.

The officers called a dog out. The dog arrived within minutes and alerted on bumper.

The officers removed the bumper and found $300,000.

The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop -- and the officers went beyond the scope of their consent by removing the bumper.

So -- what should the officers have done????

The Stop
1. Vasquez was on parole -- officers can stop a suspect who is on parole without reasonable suspicion. Be sure the prosecutor has the paperwork on this to offer it at the suppression hearing. (In this case, it was never offered -- so no proof that Vasquez was on parole.)

2. Try to find a traffic stop rationale -- that gives TWO theories for the stop rather than just one. If you can't get a traffic violation, wait til the suspect stops and then execute a consensual encounter (In that case, of course, you don't need reasonable suspicion.)

The Consent
Officers are bound by the consent they ask for. Asking for consent and then taking the car a part usually will not be constitutional as that goes way beyond the "scope" of the consent obtained.

PC
Once the dog alerted, there was pc to search. Always have a dog with you at the time of the stop -- have the dog sniff right away. (In this case the stop was bad so everything gathered after that was the fruit of the poisonous tree.)

Best -

DA

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Friday, April 3, 2009

Illinois Officers Legal Source Book - 2009 Edition

I have gotten a ton of questions about, and requests for, the 2009 Illinois Officers Legal Source Book.

Frankly, it is "completed" -- at least 99%. I hate to go print it before GANT is decided as then I will have to revise a relative substantial portion of the book if the case is decided against officers -- and then re-print it. If the case is decided in favor of officers there will be no change in the law.

In my opinion, if this case is decided against law enforcement, it will be one of the worst decisions in criminal procedural history for officers as it will basically take away a search theory that officers have possessed since 1981. In that case it will IMO be the biggest criminal procedure case for officers since MIRANDA.

The search theory / doctrine I am writing about in the above paragraph is this -- once officers have arrested an occupant out of a vehicle the officers may search the entire passenger compartment incident to the arrest. This search has been constitutional even if the arrestee was handcuffed and in the back seat of the patrol car.

The problem with these searches is that they basically violated the reasoning or rationale for the search incident to arrest doctrine -- that is, officers can search under this doctrine only areas where an arrestee may be able to lunge and grab a weapon or destroy evidence.

In GANT, the Arizona Supreme court basically ruled that an arrestee is not going to be able to lunge to his car and grab a weapon or destroy evidence if the arrestee is handcuffed and in the back seat of the patrol car.

The United States Supreme Court will soon determine if the Arizona Supreme Court is right or wrong.

This case was one of the first cases to be argued to the Supreme Court during this term (I think back in November). Many cases argued after GANT have long since been decided by the High Court, so I am very curious why the Court has not delivered an opinion on this case.

But I DO suspect they will decide soon.

So to make a short story LONG, I am going to wait a little longer in order to include the GANT case in my next Illinois Officers LEGAL Source Book.

If you would like the 2008 book, I will be more than happy to send it to you.

And I will be giving out a 2009 book (draft) -- without the GANT case -- in my seminars in Illinois.

If you have any questions about this, please don't hesitate to write me at DAA2000@aol.com.

BTW -- I asked for feedback at an earlier blog. I have gotten lots of kind responses. Thanks so much. It helps me to know that this is worth doing by knowing that you are reading this.

Best-

DA

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Friday, March 27, 2009

Seminars -- April, May and June

I try to set up most of my seminars about six months in advance.

If you want me to do a seminar at for your agency, or you are interested in attending any of the following seminars, e-mail me at DAA2000@aol.com.

Here is my seminar schedule for the next few months -

April 14-16 East Hazel Crest Village Hall -- 4th Amendment for Sgt and Lts

April 21-23 DuPage County Sheriff Dept -- 4th Amendment for Drug Officers

April 28-30 Palatine PD -- 4th Amendment for Sgts and Lts

May 12-14 Lisle PD -- 4th Amendment for Officers

May 26-28 -- Montgomery PD -- 4th Amendment for Sgts and Lts

June 9 -- Lombard Village Hall -- Legal Issues Related to Taking Statements

June 11 -- Hodgkins PD -- Civil Liability / Section 1983

June 17 -- Bolingbrook PD -- Recent Case Law

June 23-25 -- Buffalo Grove -- 4th Amendment for Officers

Best -

DA

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Searches -- Parolees

All officers know that parolees must normally sign an "agreement" to avoid incarceration. The agreement usually contains language that permits searches of parolees and their property.

There have been some changes in the "rules" related to these searches in the recent years.

Until relatively recently, Illinois courts did not allow searches of parolees by law enforcement without "reasonable suspicion."

Recently however, both the United States and Illinois Supreme Courts have changed the rules on searches of parolees and their property.

The United States Supreme Court (USSC) in Samson v United States held that officers may search a parolee based solely on his condition of release. The court ruled that basically a parolee was not a lot different than an inmate as it related to his / her expectations of privacy -- and that the conditions of release then determined the parolee's rights v. the officers' powers.

In California that condition of release included the clause that parolees may be searched at any by parole officers or law enforcement officers. Because Samson accepted this term by his signature, his expectations of privacy were significantly diminished such that officers could search him with any theory.

The rationale for this rule was that over 2/3 of parolees are returned to prison. That figure was / is so high that the government has a legitimate purpose in ensuring that parolees do not possess contraband or weapons.

After Samson, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with the case of People v Wilson, 885 NE2d 1033 (2008), which presented a similar situation related to the suspicionless search of a parolee's premises.

In Wilson, the parolee "agreed" to the search of person, property or residence as a condition of his release.

Subsequently, officers searched the parolee's home and discovered cocaine and heroin.

The Illinois Supreme Court, based on Samson, held that the evidence was admissible.

For those in AZ -- the 9th Circuit, in the same facts as Wilson ruled that the evidence was admissible for the same reasons. US v Lopez, 474 F3d 1208 (9th Cir 2007)

Warning: these cases give officers a lot of power -- abuse the rule, lose the rule.

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Monday, September 29, 2008

Seeking Consent After A Traffic Stop

The Illinois Supreme Court, in the recent case of People v Cosby, has apparently changed the rules (again) related to traffic stops and seeking consent.

I think soon we will all recognize that this is the most important 4th Amendment case in Illinois Supreme Court history.

The following are the facts and holding of Cosby -

An officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic citation during the early morning hours. The officer had a hunch the driver might have drugs in the vehicle, so he called for a back-up. The officer gave the suspect his paperwork etc back and gave him a warning ticket. The officer then asked the driver if he could search his car.

The driver consented. The officer searched the car and found drugs, etc.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The seizure, for purposes of the traffic stop, is over when the officer gives the driver the ticket and paper work.

2. A second officer on who is present, after the traffic stop, apparently does not create a seizure -- if only the two officers total are present.

3. The officer may seek (should) consent immediately after returning the license and paperwork.

If you have any questions, don't hesitate to write.

Best -

DA

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Monday, September 22, 2008

Traffic Stops and Consent -- Supreme Court of Illinois

Here are the basic facts --

An officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic citation during the early morning hours. The officer had a hunch the driver might have drugs in the vehicle, so he called for a back-up. The officer gave the suspect his paperwork etc back and gave him a warning ticket. The officer then asked the driver if he could search his car.

The driver consented. The officer searched the car and found drugs.

The driver moved to suppress the drugs.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that by giving the ticket and all paperwork back to the driver the driver was no longer seized and an officer may seek consent during this period. Therefore the evidence was admissible.

Best --

DA

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Sunday, July 6, 2008

New Case -- Seeking consent during a traffic stop

In my last blog I stated that the only limitation on an officer's ability to seek consent was time.

Officers in the past have assumed that the time issue can be defeated by simply telling the suspect that he is free to leave -- and then asking him some questions leading to a request for consent -- as it is presumed at that point there is no seizure.

I do not think think this will work in Illinois any more.

In People v Bernstein (6-28-08) an officer during a traffic stop asked Berstein to join him in the patrol car. The officer gave Bernstein a warning and then said something like -- "All righty, have a safe trip and nice day."

Immediately thereafter, before Bernstein exited the patrol car, the officer inquired whether Bernstein had anything illegal in his car. This question led to a request to search -- take a "quick look" into -- Bernstein's car.

The officer found drugs in the car.

The trial court ruled that the drugs were admissible as the conversation became a consensual encounter after the officer told Bernstein he was free to leave.

The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed stating, "We do not consider the officer's superficial termination of the traffic stop to have concluded it. The officer returned the documents and immediately began posing questions to Bernstein. The officer inserted his request to ask more questions in the 'seamless transition between mandatory and consensual interaction.' There was an insufficient passage of time or a perceivable shift in Blanks' authoritative stance such that a reasonable person in Bernstein's position would have recognized that the traffic stop had ended and a consensual encounter begun."

There are several other Illinois cases that have ruled that it is very difficult to return back to tier 1 (no seizure) from tier 2 (detention).

If you suspect that the traffic offender has something illegal, my suggestion is:
1. call for a back-up to help;
2. very early in the stop ask about illegal substances;
3. tell the suspect you are going to issue a warning;
4. ask for consent -- get it in writing if possible;
5. have your back-up search the car within 10 or 15 minutes of the stop.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that you must conduct your business within the time it takes to do a traffic stop (that's a good reason to get an officer to help you). Remember that as more an more defense attorneys will be trying to get their clients off on these rules.

Best -
DA

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Thursday, May 29, 2008

Traffic Stops -- Scope Issues -- Consent

I have been asked a lot of questions a lot of times about whether officers can ask for consent during a traffic stop. now -- i.e. has the law changed back again in this area?

The one word answer to this is -- Yes.

Now let me try to expain -- and make a short answer long.... in a 10 point blog.

1. This all sort of started with the case of People v Gonzalez at the Illinois Supreme Court five years ago. The Illinois Supreme Court in Gonzalez decided and ruled (basically) that an officer must have reasonable suspicion to do anything meaningful during a traffic stop except for the questions related to the reason for the stop. Virtually, everything else an officer did went beyond the "scope" limitation of Gonzalez.

2. There are a number of cases that killed off the Gonzalez case -- and it's "scope" requirement, so let's talk about them.

3. Of course, the US Supreme Court is the final arbiter of what the 4th Amendment says.

4. To reiterate -- The Illinois Supreme Court in Gonzalez decided to set up a 3-part test in Gonzalex -- basically holding that officer cannot do anything outside the reason for the stop -- unless the officer has reasonable suspicion to do something else.

5. This made Illinois Courts of Appeals say that it goes beyond the "scope" of a traffic stop to seek consent.

6. Then the USSC accepted the appeals of the Illinois AG in CAballes (dog sniff during a traffic stop) and Harris (checking warrants on passengers) Illinois Supreme Court cases where the Illinois Supreme Court suppressed the evidence.

7. The USSC in these cases told the Illinois Supreme Court that the 4th Amendment's scope requirement during a traffic stop only relates primarily to TIME implying that anything that can be done during the 10-15 period of the traffic stop is basically ok -- including bringing a dog out (Cabelles) or checking warrants on a passenger (Harris).

8. When the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently reviewed the cases of Caballes and Harris the ILlinois Supreme Court agreed with the USSC ( the Illinois Supreme Court could have stayed with their original decision -- and rejected the USSC decisions -- under the Illinois Constitution -- but decided not to).

9. The USSC never said that consent searches were not beyond the scope of a traffic stop -- because that was not issue in the cases.

10. However in several Illinois Courts of Appeals cases after Harris and Caballes -- the issue of consent arose. They all said that Gonzalez was dead and that the issue now was TIme -- One of the first and best of these cases was a case called People v Starnes. That case specifically said that the scope requirement of Gonzalez is dead.

So officers may now seek consent without having reasonable suspicion.

Let me say in conclusion -- a phrase you have heard many times -- if you abuse it, you will lose it. I.e. -- seek consent only in cases where you have some good reason to believe there is contraband or some crime-related evidence in the vehicle. IMO the reason the Supreme Court of Illinois took this power away from officers for a while was that the power was being abused.

Best -

DA

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Friday, November 23, 2007

Section 1983 - How can we limit its impact on officers?

Section 1983 is having a serious impact on pocketbooks of officers, their departments -- and their taxpayers.

We need to limit its impact by getting Congress to pass an amendment requiring some malicious or wanton and willful state of mind by the officer in order for the plaintiff -- and his attorney -- to collect for constitutional torts.

In many states the impact of common law torts have been greatly mitigated by state legislatures requiring some relatively high level of either bad conduct or bad intentions by the officer who are sued. Many states, for example, require that the plaintiff prove that the act of the officer must be "wanton and willful" in order to create a cause of action for a plaintiff.

I think that if officers could get the American people and Congress to understand the cost of these 1983 law suits -- and that THEY -- the citizens -- are paying for them, they will be happy to support legislation limiting 1983 actions.

If you are interested in getting involved in this fight, please let me know at my e-mail -- DAA2000@aol.com

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Gant -- The biggest case at the USSC for this term

Well, I guess it's almost official. The United States Supreme Court should decide Arizona v Gant this year.

This case will probably have the biggest affect on law enforcement of any other case, especially if the Court rules in favor of Gant.

Here's a little background --

The vast majority of states have interpreted New York v Belton to mean that officers can search the passenger compartment of vehicles incident to a valid custodial arrest even if the arrestee is handcuffed and in the back seat of the patrol car.

The Arizona Supreme Court in Gant held that officers may not search the arrestee's vehicle once the arrestee is placed in the patrol car as at that time the arrestee has no reasonable liklihood of gaining access to his vehicle and procuring a weapon or destroying any evidence.

Although the Arizona decision makes some sense -- as the reason for the search is to avoid the problem of arrestees lunging for a weapon or to destroy evidence -- the United States Supreme Court -- and most state supreme courts -- have determined previously that officers should not have to endanger themselves by letting an arrestee remain near the arrestee's vehicle while the officers search it. Obviously, if offficers wanted to take such risks, they could (and once did) complete such searches. In other words, if the officers could have searched the vehicles moments before, why should they lose that ability simply because they want to protect themselves?

Unfortunately, a number of Supreme Court Justices have recently voiced their distaste for this "bright-line rule" giving officers this "free" search -- and have suggested that such searches should be unconstitutional.

One such Justice is Scalia, a Justice who is very conservative -- and normally on the side of officers.

He stated in the recent Thornton case that he saw no reason to permit officers to search vehicles once the arrestee was safely tucked away in the officer's vehicle. You can bet that there are at least three (hopefully not four) other justices who feel the same! One thing you can be pretty sure of -- This will be a 5-4 decision -- one way or the other.

I am not sure when this case will be accepted for cert or argued -- but I noticed some law enforcement organizations have filed amicus (friend of the Court) briefs in favor of reversal. These briefs simply tell the court how important this decision is for law enforcement.

I will keep you apprised of the progress of this case on this blog -- so check back.

Until then -- unless you are in Arizona -- you can still search the passenger compartment and closed containers therein incident to the lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of the vehicle.

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Sunday, November 18, 2007

Vehicles -- Consent Searches

Officers in Illinois have been confused about their power to ask for consent to search a vehicle for the past several years as there have been a series of cases seeming to permit the power and then take it away.

One thing is sure -- if an officer has reasonable suspicion, he /she may ask for consent. That has always been the case. However, in most states it is constitutional to seek consent without reasonable suspicion.

Since the Illinois Supreme Court case of People v Gonzalez a few years ago, officers have been given signs on many occasions that possibly it is ok to seek consent and search as long as the search takes no longer than it would take to write the ticket(s). This inference has been drawn from United States Supreme Court cases where that Court has reversed the Illinois Supreme Court ruling that officers may not have a dog sniff the vehicle of a traffic offender (CABELLES) and that officers may not "run" a passenger (HARRIS) even when these can be accomplished within the time of a traffic stop.

In other words the USSC has held that bringing out a dog, running passengers (and probably seeking consent) are constitutional as long as they can be accomplished within the time it takes to conduct a traffic stop.

Now we have some Illinois Court of Appeals cases that will confuse officers even more.

First, People v Starnes, which I discussed in another blog -- the court said it was ok to seek consent.

Now, in a very recent case (Halloween of 2007), the court of appeals, People v Roa, implies that officers must have reasonable suspicion to seek consent.

However, the reasonable suspicion in this case seems a bit thin. In Roa, the officer who had stopped thousands of vehicles as an interdiction specialist, noticed that the driver was unusually nervous and had new air freshener.

The court ruled that the consent search was constitutional because there was reasonable suspicion for the search.

There was a strong dissenting opinion in the case that nervousness and an air freshener have never before been sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion.

So we can "suspect" that this case will be appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will decide whether reasonable suspicion is still required to seek consent.

In my opinion, officers should always be able to articulate SOME suspicion before seeking consent anyway. Again, in my opinion, one of the reasonas why the court began requiring reasonable suspicion to seek consent was that some officers were getting bad publicity in the media for seeking consent to search virtually every car they stopped.

There is lots more information on consent searches in the Illinois Legal Source Book.

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Sunday, November 4, 2007

Force when using tasers -- How much us too much?

"Reasonable Force" and Tasers

Recently there has been a spate of controversy over tasers -- check out Youtube.com and do a search for tasers. Also, almost daily there is another story in the news about somebody getting tased -- with a video for graphic exaggeration.

Most citizens believe that officers do not need to use force -- or as much force as they use -- to subdue suspects. This is primarily a result of media bias against the the device.

The recent case of the student dissident at the John Kerry speech is a classic example. (Again, check this out on Youtube.)

Here is a brief summary of what occurred. The student asks Kerry a series of questions. Apparently, the student takes too much time -- and then someone cuts off his microphone. Officers then step in to escort the student from the premises -- or arrest him (it is not clear to me which). The student, sort of passively resists. He then begins yelling for help. The student will not put his hands behind his back, so the officers tase him. The student then screams in pain. The student then is cuffed and the officers escort him out of the building.

Most officers who watch this believe the force is reasonable. Most citizens believe that it is excessive.

When these cases have been tried, most jurors tend to side with officers -- as experts for the defense testify that tasing is a lot safer than trying to physically subdue a suspect -- and that the pain induced by the taser is not dangerous -- and only temporary in order to gain compliance.

Which brings me to my final point. Force used to subdue suspects must be "reasonable." Courts and juries normally bend over backwards to try to see it from the officer's point of view. But the media is hurting officers here -- and many in society now believe that tasing suspects -- except for aggressive resistance -- is excessive.

We have not not heard the final word on this. So until we do, I would suggest that officers should be careful about using a taser during the passive resistance of a suspect.

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Sunday, October 28, 2007

Seminars I will be doing for the next four months

Here are the seminars I will be presenting for the next four months --

I am now open to do seminars for individual departments, so if your department wants a seminar for its officers, contact me at this website or at DAA2000@aol.com.

All of the classes I do are intended to make officers as "court smart" as they are street smart, so I emphasize "creative policing" to do the right thing in the street and understand the affect of what happens on the street -- and how that translates into testimony in court.

October 30 -- Hodgkins PD -- Civil Liability, Constitutional Issues, etc.

November 7-9 -- MTU 4 Moline -- Search and Seizure, Civil Liability, etc.

November 13-15 --Darien PD (NEMRT)-- Search and Seizure, Civil Liability, etc.

November 19 -- Oak Lawn -- Civil Liability, Constitutional Issues, etc.

November 27-29 -- McHenry Govt Center (NEMRT) -- Search and Seizure, Civil Liability, etc.

December 4-6 -- W Dundee Public Safety (NEMRT) -- Search and Seizure, Civil Liability, etc.

December 11-13 -- Oswego PD (NEMRT) -- Search and Seizure, Civil Liability, etc. (Sgrs)

January 4 -- Buffalo Grove (NEMRT) -- Law of Interrogations

January 15-17 -- Marana, AZ -- Search and Seizure, Civil Liability, etc.

January 21-25 -- PHX, AZ -- Constitutional Law, Report Writing, Testimony, Civil Liability, etc.

January 31 -- Naperville PD (NEMRT) -- Recent Case Law

February 5-7 -- Gurnee PD (NEMRT) -- Search and Seizure, Civil Liability, etc. (Sgts)

February 13 -- Oak Lawn PD -- Civil Liability, Constitutional Issues, etc.

February 19-28 -- El Paso, TX PD -- Constitutional Law, Civil Liability, etc.

Again, if you are interested in a seminar, please contact me. I am now scheduling for March and April.

Best -

Dale Anderson

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Thursday, October 25, 2007

Traffic Stops -- may officers seek consent?

A relatively recent case says yes -- as long as the consent search doesn't prolong the stop.

The case is People v Starnes -- an Illinois Court of Appeals case -- District 2.

In Starnes, an officer stopped the car Starnes was driving on minor traffic-type offenses.
After the stop, the officer asked to search Starnes and his car. He consented.
The officer found drugs.

The Court of Appeals basically stated that since several United States Supreme Court cases have said that officers may do things during a traffic or Terry stop that do not relate to the reason for the detention, that Illinois is bound by those decisions until the Illinois Supreme Court decides to rule otherwise under the Illinois Constitution.

The United States Supreme Court cases discussed which support the decison are:
1. CABELLES (which held that officers may bring a dog out during a traffic stop).
2. HARRIS (which held basically that officers may run passengers during a traffic stop).
3. MUELLER (which held that officers may question detainees about matters other than that for which the detainee is being held).

The court cited several other Illinois cases supporting its decison.

The case which tends to go against this court of appeals decision is People v Gonzalez. The Illinois Supreme Court in Gonzalez basically ruled that officers may NOT do anything during a traffic stop except traffic matters unless the officer has reasonable suspicion to ask about the other matters.

According to the State Appellate Prosecutors Office, the defendant did not appeal the case to the Illinois Supreme Court.

For now -- at least until the Illinois Supreme Court rules differently -- I would say, you can seek consent to search as long as you can consduct the search during the time it takes to do a traffic stop.

A word to the wise -- use good judgment in who to ask consent from. This is a power that the courts can still take away (again).

Best --

DA

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Wednesday, October 10, 2007

Arresting TERRY Suspects Who Refuse to Give Their Names

I have been discussing the bill -- HB993 -- which requires a TERRY suspect to reveal his name and explain his actions -- with numerous officers and attorneys.

1. The statute, as written, would be unconstitutional to the extent it requires an explanation of his actions from the TERRY suspect. The 5th Amendment cases make clear that a suspect may remain silent in the face of questioning.

2. Even worse, the statute has no teeth whatsoever in that it provides for no sanctions if the suspect refuses to give his name. So the bill as presently written is worse than nothing.

I have been told -- and I believe -- that most officers who are street-smart can get a name and explanation from most suspects.

The problem is the street-smart gang member who will not talk.

Let's say you see a gang member with a television set at midnight in an alley. You stop him, he is mute, and you can't figure out where the burglary is. Some courts would hold that there might be probable cause -- but most courts would rule that there is not enough suspicion to arrest.

At this point you MUST let the suspect go -- and the victim's tv -- unless you can figure out relatively quickly where the burglary occurred! (Technically, you cannot hold the tv and tell the suspect to pick it up the next morning.)

Now let's say instead of releasing the suspect -- you take to the police station for fingerprinting, etc. -- which many officers do -- the United States Supreme Court has ruled this conduct is tantamont to an arrest -- and is unconstitutional. Therefore not only will the evidence be suppressed -- but you are vulnerable to being successfully sued.

So, let's say you let suspect go -- The next morning the victim calls the station reporting the burglary -- where he / she complains of lost jewelry, etc -- in addition to the tv. Do you tell him / her that you caught the burglar -- but had to let him go -- with the victim's property??

I think -

1. Officers need this statute for that 1 in 100 case where the supects do not talk at all. I think you should always have the power to obtain a suspect's name during a TERRY stop.

2. Most other states already have this statute -- and many enacted it after the HIIBEL case (in 2004), which basically held that you have the power to get a suspect's name during a TERRY stop.

I, and others who feel like I do, are going to try to get the bill straightened out and then I'm going to ask every officer to get their Senator and Representative to vote for the bill.

I will keep you appraised of our progress in these blogs.

Let's get this passed this year.

DA

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Monday, October 1, 2007

Seminar

I will be presenting a law seminar at the Oak Lawn Police Department on November 2.

The seminar will include issues related to civil liability and the 4th Amendment implications related to dealing with suspects. I will also discuss testifying and other related issues.

If you are interested contact me at DAA2000@aol.com for details.

Best -

Dale Anderson

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Monday, September 17, 2007

DUI -- Can officers enter homes chasing drunks?

First -- the United States Supreme Court over 20 years ago said that an officer could not enter premises under the "exigency" doctrine simply because the suspect's BAC might dissipate. (WELSH V WISCONSIN) The Court held that DUI / DWI was not a serious enough offense to permit such entries.

Recently -- courts around the country have begun to recognize the serious nature of DUI -- and are beginning to permit the entry of homes to arrest drunk drivers -- particularly when the officers are in "hot" pursuit.

Very recently, in People v Wear, for example, a suspected drunk disregarded an officers' orders to stop, by emergency equipment -- and entered his home despite the officer's verbal commands to stop.

When the officer got to the front door, he had to deal with a female at the door. Wear, who stood behind the female, continued to proclaim that he was home (implying that the officer could not get him).

The officer could see that Wear showed many signs of being DUI at that point -- and entered the home to arrest Wear. Wear refused tests.

The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that the officer had probable cause for DUI (and eluding) -- and that the officer was in hot pursuit.

The court in so ruling stated that, unlike 20 years ago, DUI is now a very serious crime which should permit entry under the hot pursuit doctrine.

PS In a recent state supreme court case (State v Legg in Iowa) the court stated that if we let a drunk get off just because she makes it to her garage, what are we telling drunk in every bar in this state at 2:00 a.m.?? (for me this is a great argument in any state court.)

Warning -- I do not believe a court is going to permit entry without some sign(s?) of DUI. a simple traffic offense will probably not be sufficient even if the driver is drunk.

Important Note -- the court in Wear noted that probably on summary suspension the 4th Amendment should NOT apply anyway as that is an administrative / civil -- not a criminal -- proceeding...

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Friday, August 31, 2007

Anonymous Tips -- Can they create reasonable suspicion to stop?

When anonymous informants cannot create reasonable suspicion

Generally, anonymous tips cannot provide reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect because the tipster is not accountable for the information provided. (*But see below)


For example, in FLORIDA V JL an anonymous caller told police that a black man on a certain corner wearing a plaid shirt had a gun. Officers saw the man matching the description, stopped him, patted him down and found the weapon.


The United States Supreme Court held that the anonymous caller did not create reasonable suspicion for the stop in that the informant was not accountable for any of the information given. Therefore the weapon was suppressed. (* See Below.)


When anonymous informants can give reasonable suspicion

In one of the most important 4th amendment decisions ever, the United States Supreme Court held that an anonymous tip does create reasonable suspicion to stop if the tip predicts the movement of the suspect. The Court reasoned that anonymous tipsters are more reliable if they can foretell the movements of the suspect to be stopped.

The salient facts of the case were this -- an anonymous caller told police that a woman, White, would leave her home with a briefcase. She would get into her car and would drive to a certain motel where she would exchange drugs -- in her briefcase -- for money.

A couple of problems for the police here were that the police had no criminal record on the woman -- and she did not have the briefcase in her hand when she got into her car -- so really no crime-related corroboration at all.

The officers followed White as she drove toward the motel, then stopped her.

They asked to search the briefcase (which was already in the car when she entered it earlier). She consented to the search -- and the officers found the drugs.

The question in the case was -- did the officers have reasonable suspicion to stop the car in the first place? The Court's answer is above. (ALABAMA V WHITE)

* IMPORTANT TIP -- The Court implied that even in those cases where the anonymous tipster does not predict movement, the stop will be upheld if the officers would have just saved the tape of the call.

** ANOTHER IMPORTANT TIP -- AND -- Advice to the wise -- always save the tape (whether the tip predicts movement or not). That way you never have to worry about a defense attorney calling you a liar on the witness stand -- i.e. saying you never got a call at all -- and that you are just making up the tip.

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Saturday, August 11, 2007

Searching Vehicles -- Under the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine

Depending on how you count them, there are about ten (10) theories or doctrines which permit you to search vehicles. Each one has a different when where and why. The one I am going to discuss here is the "search incident to arrest" doctrine.

The general reasoning, or rationale, for the search incident to arrest doctrine is that an arrestee can "lunge" to a weapon or destroy evidence contemporaneous with (at the same time as) the arrest.

This type of search has been around long before the Constitution.

Unfortunately, as the search relates to vehicles, it has been hard for courts to apply.

In the 70's, courts usually permitted officers to search vehicles under this doctrine only when the arrestee had not yet been handcuffed and was still near the vehicle.

Officers, in order to "game" the system would have other officers stand near the arrestee while some officers searched the vehicle -- in order to comply with rules of the search incident doctrine. The whole approach started to become a bit ridiculous and farcical.

Then in the early 80's the United States Supreme Court ruled that it was better to just create a "bright-line" rule for officers. That bright-line rule was simply that officers may always search the passenger compartment of vehicles incident to a valid custodial arrest (New York v Belton).

Since that decison, almost every court in the country has assumed that officers may handcuff the arrestee -- and place the arrestee in the back of the patrol car prior to the search. Unfortunately, last year one United States Supreme Court Justice (Scalia) stated in one case -- how can it be a search incident to arrest when the arrestee cannot possibly get to the passenger compartment to destroy evidence or obtain a weapon (Thornton v United States)? Since Scalia is a very influential CONSERVATIVE member of the Court, his opinion sort of sent shock waves through the system (as obviously most liberal members of the court probably feel this way).

Now the "other shoe" has dropped -- The Arizona Supreme Court ruled recently that basically officers may NOT search a vehicle under the search incident doctrine once the arrestee has been secured (State v Gant). This holding means, in effect, that officers will be required generally to go back to the 70's approach of allowing arrestees to remain near the vehicle until the officers search it.

Arizona intends to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court. If the Court accepts the case, the decison will have an enormous impact on law enforcement throughout the country. It will be a very close case, I think -- probably a 5-4 one way or the other. I predict that the Court will affirm the Arizona decision -- and that the rule by the end of next year will be that officers may no longer place arrestees in the patrol car and then search the vehicle.

As an aside, obviously, if one of the other nine search doctrines or theories apply to the search of the vehicle. officers will still be able to search the vehicle under the rules of one or more of those theories. But I predict that the search incident theory will soon be severely restricted if the United States Supreme Court takes the Gant case and rules on it.

Presently, officers in Illinois and Texas may, of course, continue to search the passenger compartment even if though the arrestee is in the back seat of the patrol car (until the United States Supreme Court rules otherwise).

However, Arizona officers normally may search the passenger compartment only if the arrestee (or possibly other occupant) is within lunging distance of the vehicle, uless the United States Supreme Court rules otherwise.

You can learn lots more about the search incident to arrest doctrine as it relates to the search of vehicles in my legal source book.

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Saturday, August 4, 2007

Legislation -- Arresting TERRY Suspects Who Refuse to Identify

Presently the HIIBEL case says, in effect, that have the constitutional POWER to get TERRY suspects' names. In other words, a TERRY suspect has no RIGHT to refuse to give you his name during a lawful stop.

However, since HIIBEL was decided by the United States Supreme Court, we have attempted on several occasions to get legislation passed to make it a CRIME to refuse to give a name during a TERRY stop.

Unfortunately, we been unable to get the legislation passed.

The Black Coalition and the Bar Association have thwarted efforts to pass the legislation arguing that the law will just be used by police to harass blacks and othe minority groups.

The impact of the refusal to pass this legislation is that if you, as an officer, see a suspect in an alley at midnight with a televison set, you can ask him for his name -- but if he won't give it to you, there is nothing you can do about it!

You cannot take such suspects to the station to fingerprint them. That is unconstitutional. (If you have a fingerprint kit, you can fingerprint them there at the scene -- if they will let you.)

So -- here is my very strong suggestion. Find out who your respresentatives are down in Springfield. And talk to them about voting for this legislation.

This legislation will soon be offered again this year in the House and Senate.

If you decide to do nothing, don't complain when the legislation is NOT passed again -- and you get screwed in court because you don't have this power -- that you should have.

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Tuesday, July 31, 2007

Q and A - Running Passengers

Q: Can officers run passengers to see if they have warrants?

A: Yes, a recent United States Supreme Court case held that officers may run passengers if the officers can obtain the passengers identifications voluntarily.

Cases in Illinois, including People v Roberson, have acknowledged this new ruling.

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